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Recent Cases
Eighth Circuit Holds that
Neither the Comment K
Strict Liability Defense
Nor the Individualized
Medical Judgment Rule
Relieved an IUD
Manufacturer's Duty to
Warn Consumers
Directly
In Hill v. Searle Laboratories,
884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989), the
United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit found that Arkansas would adopt comment k of
section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts as a qualified
affirmative defense to strict liability for "unavoidably unsafe products." However, the court held that
the comment k defense was not
applicable to Searle's CU-7 IUD
contraceptive because that device
was not an "unavoidably unsafe"
product serving an exceptional social need. Furthermore, the court
held that Searle was not relieved of
its duty to warn consumers concerning the dangers and side effects
of using the CU-7 because a
woman's decision to use an IUD
did not involve an individualized
medical judgement.
Background
The Copper 7 ("CU-7") contraceptive is an intrauterine device
("IUD") composed substantially
of copper. Because copper is a
potentially reactive chemical, the
Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") has classified the CU-7 as
a prescription drug. Thus, the CU7 is unavailable without a physician's order and must be inserted
by a physician.
Searle Laboratories ("Searle")
began marketing the CU-7 during
the early 1970s, when IUDs became accepted as a safe alternative
to oral contraceptives. The FDA
tested and approved the CU-7 as a
safe and effective medical device.
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The FDA also approved the labeling and patient brochure that accompanied the CU-7.
In July 1981, Dr. Dennis Davidson ("Davidson") surgically implanted a CU-7 intrauterine device
in Mrs. Connie Hill ("Hill"). Approximately three years later, Hill
gave birth to a child. Shortly thereafter, she underwent tubal ligation
surgery. During the course of the
surgery, Hill's treating physician,
Dr. Roland Reynolds, discovered
that the CU-7 had perforated Hill's
uterus and become partially
embedded in her small bowel.
Hill sued Searle in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The suit
alleged that Searle was liable for
Hill's injuries under the theories of
negligence, strict liability, and
breach of warranty. Hill claimed
that Searle had failed to provide
her with proper warning as to the
possible side effects of the CU-7
and denied that she had ever received the CU-7's patient brochure.
The District Court's Decision
Under Arkansas law, a manufacturer may be strictly liable if its
product is in a defective condition
which renders the product unreasonably unsafe. A product is considered defective if the manufacturer did not adequately warn consumers about the product's
dangers.
Comment k of section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts
provides a qualified defense to
strict liability. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402 comment k
(1965). Numerous states have incorporated comment k into their
product liability laws. Comment k
applies to "unavoidably unsafe"
products which are considered extraordinarily beneficial or critically necessary to the public. Because consumers need such products despite the risks, the comment
k defense shifts the duty of care
from the manufacturer to the consumer. A manufacturer may
thereby escape liability for any

injuries the product causes unless
the manufacturer negligently manufactured the product or failed to
warn consumers of the product's
possible side effects.
Although Arkansas courts had
not yet expressly adopted the comment k defense, the district court
determined that Arkansas courts
probably would do so. In addition,
the court held that the comment k
defense applied to all prescription
drugs, including IUDs.
The district court also held that
Arkansas courts would adopt the
"learned intermediary" rule.
Under this rule, a manufacturer
fulfills its duty to warn consumers
if it provides proper warnings to
prescribing physicians, rather than
directly to the consumers. The
court determined that the package
inserts accompanying the CU-7
were sufficient to fully apprise
Hill's treating physician of the
risks associated with the device.
Therefore, Searle had sufficiently
warned Hill regarding the CU-7's
possible side effects. The court also
noted that Hill had signed a form
stating that she understood the
risks of the operation before the
CU-7 was inserted. Accordingly,
the court granted Searle's motion
for summary judgment. Hill appealed the ruling to the United
States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit.
The Eighth Circuit's Opinion
The Comment K Defense to
Strict Liability. Hill argued that the
Arkansas courts would not adopt
comment k. Hill noted that although the Arkansas legislature
had adopted section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, it
had not explicitly adopted comment k. Searle, on the other hand,
identified numerous Arkansas Supreme Court decisions referring to
the comments of section 402A and
argued that the court implicitly
adopted all of the section 402A
comments. Searle also noted that
comment k had been adopted overwhelmingly by other jurisdictions.
The court of appeals agreed that
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Arkansas probably would adopt
comment k as a qualified defense
to strict liability.
Hill next argued that even if
Arkansas would adopt comment k,
comment k is an affirmative defense and Searle failed to prove
that the CU-7 is within the scope of
that defense. Searle responded that
three factors supported the district
court's finding that CU-7 is an
unavoidably unsafe product: 1) the
CU-7 received FDA approval; 2)
the CU-7 was a prescription drug;
and 3) uncontradicted expert testimony indicated that the CU-7 contained the same risks as any IUD.
The court rejected each of
Searle's arguments. First, the court
found that FDA approval was not
an automatic shield to liability.
Rather, FDA standards set a minimum safety requirement. The
court further reasoned that FDA
approval militated against finding
that the CU-7 was unavoidably
unsafe: the CU-7 could not be
"generally safe" according to the
FDA and "unavoidably unsafe"
according to the comment k definition. In addition, Searle offered no
evidence that the product was unavoidably unsafe.
Second, the court rejected
Searle's argument that the comment k defense should apply to all
prescription drugs to encourage
development of new drugs. The
object of strict liability, the court
noted, was to require the manufacturer of a defective product to bear
the cost of injury. The comment k
exception to strict liability only
applies where an extraordinary social need for the product justifies
shifting the cost of injury to the
consumers. The example given in
comment k of an extraordinarily
necessary product is Pasteur's rabies vaccine. A product's prescription status does not indicate an
extraordinary need for the product. Rather, courts must determine
on a case-by-case basis whether the
need for a product justifies granting it the comment k protection.
The court held that Searle failed to
prove such an extraordinary need
for the CU-7 to justify allowing a
comment k defense. In addition,
unlike Pasteur's vaccine, the CU-7
was not the only product that could
accomplish its designed objective.
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The court cited other factors in
rejecting the comment k defense.
IUD manufacturers created a sense
of product quality through advertising which made it difficult for
consumers to appreciate the risks
of using an IUD. Also, IUD manufacturers were in a better position
to identify product risks and
spread the costs of injury to all
consumers. Accordingly, the manufacturer is better suited to absorb
the loss in these cases. Thus, the
court concluded that Searle must
bear the cost of injury from the
CU-7 if the device is found to be
defective and unreasonably dangerous.
The Independent Medical Judgment Rule. Generally, under the
theories of strict liability, breach of
warranty, and the comment k defense, a manufacturer has a duty to
warn consumers directly of a product's risks. The learned intermediary rule is an exception to this
duty. Under the learned intermediary rule, a manufacturer may rely
on doctors to warn their patients
where the product's risks are too
technical for patients to understand and the manufacturer cannot
directly warn each patient. Searle
argued that Arkansas courts would
apply the learned intermediary
rule in this type of case. Searle
further argued that under the
learned intermediary rule it adequately warned Hill's physician of
possible uterine perforation.
The court declined to apply the
learned intermediary rule. Rather,
it held that the Arkansas courts
would adopt the test established in
Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498
F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974), to determine whether adequate warning
was given. Under the Reyes test,
consumers receive adequate warnings if (1) the manufacturer provides a meaningful, complete
warning which patients can understand; or (2) physicians routinely
make an intervening individualized medical judgment that this
particular drug or treatment is necessary and desirable for a patient.
The court held that Searle failed
to satisfy either requirement of the
Reyes test. The court noted that
IUDs and other forms of birth
control differ from most prescription drugs. Normally, a physician

will make an individualized independent determination that a prescription drug is warranted. However, a physician usually does not
make an individualized medical
judgment in a woman's birth control decision. While the physician
may recommend a certain method
of birth control, the patient usually
decides, based upon personal factors often undisclosed to the physician, whether or not to use birth
control and which method to use.
Thus, the court held that Dr.
Davidson was not an intervening
party between Hill and Searle. In
addition, the court found that it
was feasible for Searle to warn Hill
directly of the risks. Furthermore,
the FDA required such warnings.
Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the district
court to determine whether Hill
received adequate warning about
the risks and hazards associated
with using the CU-7.
Dissenting Opinion
In a dissenting opinion, Judge
Magill argued that the CU-7 was
not defective in its design or manufacture, and that Searle had not
failed to give adequate warnings.
Hill's own expert witness testified
that the CU-7 was not defectively
manufactured. In addition, Hill's
expert witness testified that the
labeling and physician warnings
were adequate to inform Hill's
doctor about the risk of uterine
perforation. Judge Magill noted
that a pharmaceutical company
generally has a duty to warn only
-the physician. He saw no reason
why this rule should not apply to
all prescription pharmaceutical
products, including IUDs. Judge
Magill also disagreed with the majority on whether Arkansas would
adopt the Reyes test in place of the
learned intermediary rule. Thus,
Judge Magill would have affirmed
the district court's ruling.
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